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Abstract. The reports of Russian interference in the 2016 United States
elections brought into the center of public attention concerns related to
the ability of foreign actors to increase social discord and take advan-
tage of personal user data for political purposes. It has raised questions
regarding the ways and the extent to which data can be used to create
psychographical profiles to determine what kind of advertisement would
be most effective to persuade a particular person in a particular loca-
tion for some political event; Questions which have not been explored
yet due to the lack of publicly available data. In this work, we study
the political ads dataset collected by ProPublica, an American nonprofit
newsroom, using a network of volunteers in the period before the 2018
US midterm elections. With the help of the volunteers, it has been made
possible to collect not only the content of the ads but also the attributes
that were used by advertisers to target the users. We first describe the
main characteristics of the data and explore the user attributes including
age, region, activity, and more, with a series of interactive illustrations.
Furthermore, an important first step towards understating of political
manipulation via user targeting is to identify politically related ads, yet
manually checking ads is not feasible due to the scale of social media ad-
vertising. Consequently, we address the challenge of automatically classi-
fying between political and non-political ads, demonstrating a significant
improvement compared to the current text-based classifier used by ProP-
ublica, and study whether the user targeting attributes are beneficial for
this task. Our evaluation sheds light on questions, such as how user at-
tributes are being used for political ads targeting and which users are
more prone to be targeted with political ads. Overall, our contribution
of data exploration, political ad classification and initial analysis of the
targeting attributes, is designed to support future work with the ProPub-
lica dataset, and specifically with regard to the understanding of political
manipulation via user targeting.
Keywords: Political Advertising · User Targeting · Social Media.
1 Introduction
Social media platforms are collecting a great amount of personal user data.
While the data can be used to improve the effectiveness of ad recommendation,
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as demonstrated by previous works [5,6,7], it also raises concerns related to user
privacy, especially when it comes to political ads; Concerns, which have been
amplified by the reports of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elec-
tions, when fake accounts linked to a Russian troll farm bought advertisements
targeting millions of Facebook users prior to the election. These concerns were
further amplified by the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal, when it
was revealed that Cambridge Analytica harvested the personal data of millions
of people’s Facebook profiles without their consent and used it for political pur-
poses.
Despite the growing public interest, the effect of political ad targeting on
social media has not been explored yet due to the lack of publicly available data.
Facebook has made available3 an archive of ads related to politics but that has
included only the content of the ads. In an effort to promote ad transparency and
hold advertisers including political groups accountable, ProPublica, an American
nonprofit newsroom, has collected a dataset of political ads in the period before
the 2018 US midterm elections. Readers were asked to install a browser extension
that automatically collected advertisements shown to them on Facebook without
collecting personal information. With the help of the volunteers it has been made
possible to collect not only the content of the political ads but also the attributes
that were used by advertisers to target the users.
This work is the first to study the ProPublica political ads data and the use
of targeting attributes, such as age, region, activity, and interests, for political
advertising on social media. First, we describe the main properties of the dataset
and provide a series of interactive illustrations by leveraging the targeting at-
tributes, in addition to election information collected from online resources.
Second, in order to study the potential to manipulate users for political
purposes via the targeting attributes, it is important to initially identify which
ads, and advertisers, are politically oriented. We are motivated by the increasing
efforts of both social media platforms, and investigative journalism organizations,
to improve the transparency and scrutiny around political advertising and study
their effect on the spread of misinformation and social discord. However, given
the large scale of social media advertising, manually checking ads is impractical.
Consequently, we address the challenge of automatically classifying between
political and non-political ads. While the data released by ProPublica contains
only ads that were identified as political by an existing classifier, we notice
there is still a great amount of disagreement compared to the judgments by the
volunteers, and aim to improve the text classification.
In addition to identifying language differences, we also consider the following
research question: can the targeting attributes be used for identification of po-
litical ads? In other words, are there differences in the patterns of user targeting
between political and non-political ads? The evaluation of our method sheds
light on how user attributes are being used for political ads targeting and what
kind of user profiles are more likely to be targeted. For instance, we find that
3 https://www.facebook.com/ads/archive/
Automatically Identifying Political Ads on Facebook 3
political advertisers are more likely to use location targeting, and that users in
battleground states are more likely to be targeted with political ads.
2 Related Work
Previous works have demonstrated the effectiveness of targeting attributes for
ad recommendation, based on user behavior [6,7], user demographics [8] or a
combination of the two. For instance, Bagherjeiran et al. [5] proposed to build
a generic user profile with demographic and behavioral information about the
user, and learned a mapping from non-textural user features to the textual space
of ads that helped to improve the click rate on ads.
Another related line of work is the classification of political orientation from
text on social media. [4,3,9]. Pennacchiotti et al. [10] proposed to automatically
construct user profiles, to identify the political affiliation of users, based on
features related to profile information, messaging behavior, linguistic content
and social connections. Similarly, Boutet et al. [11] used the number of Twitter
messages referring to a particular political party to identify the political leaning
of users. In this work we focus on a different task. Rather than identifying a
political orientation, we aim to distinguish between political and non-political
ads. For this task, we use the novel targeting attributes, that were used by
advertisers to target users and have been made available only recently, with the
release of the ProPublica dataset.
3 The ProPublica Dataset
The ProPublica political ads dataset4 includes information regarding the content
of the ads, such as title, message and images; the number of users who voted it
as political or not political; and the targeting attributes, as described in figure 1.
Overall, the data includes more than 68,000 ads from 5,700 different advertisers
collected in the period between August 2017 and October 2018.
To manifest a better insight into the properties of the data, we provide a
series of interactive illustrations5 by leveraging the targeting attributes, in addi-
tion to election information collected from online resources. Figure 2 is one of the
graphs from this dashboard illustrating the distribution of political ads on Face-
book based on geographical information collected from the targeting attributes.
According to the map, users in highly populated states (Darker green relative
to high regional population) like California, New York, Texas, and Washington
are more prone to be targeted by political ads.
Figure 3 shows the number of political ads for each of the targeting attributes.
According to this chart, the top two targeting attributes used in political ads
are the age and the region of the Facebook users. More than 70 percent of the
time Facebook users are targeted by political ads is because they meet a certain
4 https://propublica.org/datastore/dataset/political-advertisements-from-facebook
5 https://tabsoft.co/2RErMBD
4 O. Levi et al.
Fig. 1. The Targeting Attributes. For each attribute we present the number of occur-
rences in the data, the number of unique values and a couple of examples.
Political	Ads	in	US
2018	Population
587,000	to	1,340,000
1,340,000	to	3,130,000
3,130,000	to	5,670,000
5,670,000	to	8,970,000
8,970,000	to	39,700,000
%	of	Total	Count	of	State	(data!visual!title!entitie!impre)
0.01%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
11.27%
Fig. 2. The distribution of political ads on Facebook in different states based on pop-
ulation. Circle size is the percentage calculated by number of ads in the state divided
by total number of ads in the US.
Fig. 3. Number of political ads for each of the targeting attributes.
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age and location criteria, as opposed to language, agency, and gender with only
2 percent.
Fig. 4. The distribution of political ads in different states.
Region is the second most important attribute used in political ads. As shown
in figure 4, Facebook users in California, Texas, Florida and New York are almost
10 times more likely to be targeted with political ads than states like Indiana,
Montana or even Virginia.
After age and region, interest is the third most important attribute for polit-
ical ad targeting. Figure 5 shows the top 10 interest topics used by advertisers.
According to the chart, Facebook users with interest in the ”Democratic Party”,
”Bernie Sanders” and ”Barack Obama” are more prone to be targeted by polit-
ical ads than the other interest topics.
Figure 6 shows the number of political ads for each of the battleground
states, in addition to the election outcome on the map. There appears to be no
significant correlation between the election outcome and the number of ads in
battleground states.
4 Method
To study the effects of political manipulation via user targeting, we first address
the challenge of automatically classifying between political and non-political ads.
The classification labels are based on the ’political’ and ’not political’ fields in the
data, which reflect the number of volunteers who have voted an ad as political
or not political. Ads with more ’political’ votes are classified as political and
vice versa. We disregard ads with equal amounts of ’political’ and ’not political’
votes.
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Fig. 5. Top 10 Interest topics used for targeting the political ads.
Fig. 6. Incumbent status for battleground states vs. the volume of political advertising,
represented by the circle size.
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To classify political ads, ProPublica have been using a text classifier, such
that the dataset contains only ads that were identified as political with a proba-
bility greater than 70% (see ’political probability’ field). However, a quick exam-
ination of the probabilities assigned by the classifier compared to the judgments
by the volunteers shows still a great amount of disagreement. For instance, there
are examples where the classifier picks up on a keyword like ’vote’ but it is used
in a non-political context. We hypothesize that using bigrams together with a
tree-based classifier could help with these false positives and improve the perfor-
mance of the classifier. A key consideration is also to provide a simple method
that will be computationally inexpensive.
Given that the data made available by ProPublica contains only ads that were
already identified by the current classifier, political ads, as judged by the volun-
teers, outnumber non-political ads with a 9:1 ratio. To address this challenge we
use an imbalance correction method, giving a penalty to the over-represented
class, with a weight that is inversely proportional to the class frequencies in the
input data:
Weight(y) =
n samples
n samples(y)
(1)
where n samples and n samples(y) is the number of samples in general, and
from class y , respectively.
We next turn to study our research question with regard to the potential of
the targeting attributes to help with identifying political ads. The ’targets’ field
holds the targeting attributes of each ad. As part of the data pre-processing, we
transform this field into separate columns, each representing one of the targeting
attributes. Since the ’Region’ and ’State’ attributes are mostly overlapping, we
drop the ’State’ and use the ’Region’, which occurs in more entries. We drop the
sparse attributes ’Engaged with Content’, with only 9 entries, and ’Language’,
with only 4 Non-English entries. Instead of the ’Age’ attribute, which represents
the targeted age range, we use the ’MinAge’ and ’MaxAge’ attributes, which
represent the range limits. All the attributes are treated as categorical variables
and transformed using one-hot encoding, except for the numerical attributes
’MinAge’ and ’MaxAge’. Note that this still supports cases of users with multiple
values for the same attribute, e.g. multiple interests, given that each interest is
represented by a separate binary feature.
The ad text is obtained by concatenating the ’title’ and ’message’ fields of
the ad. We use a TF-IDF vector representation as implemented by the sci-kit
learn toolkit with Snowball stemming and stop words removed.
The baseline method by ProPublica uses a Multinomial Naive Bayes clas-
sifier. For the tree-based classification model, we use the Gradient Boosting
Decision Tree (GBDT) as implemented by the LightGBM toolkit [12]. We test
two methods, with the text only and together with the targeting attributes. The
model hyper-parameters are tuned using a five-fold grid search cross validation.
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Table 1. Main Results. Our method, with the Gradient Boosting Machine classifier,
achieves significant improvement on the F1 measure compared to the existing ProP-
ublica classifier. Also, using the targeting attributes outperforms the text only based
methods. Bold: best result among methods. Statistically significant differences with
the ProPublica baseline and the GBM text only classifier are marked with ’*’ and ’**’,
respectively.
Method Precision Recall F1
MultinomialNB: Text Only (ProPublica) 88.75 96.65 92.53
GBM: Text Only 90.33 99.25 94.58*
GBM: Text + Targeting attributes 90.83 99.68 95.05**
5 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our method for political ad classification using
the F1 measure. We split the data into a train and held-out test sets. To prevent
over-fitting on patterns of specific advertisers, we separate the data such that
each advertiser is either in the train or the test set. We randomly sample 20%
of the advertisers and the ads of these advertisers are used for the test set only.
Table 1 shows the main results. Our method, that employs bigrams and a
Gradient Boosting Machine classifier, outperforms the Multinomial Naive Bayes
classifier currently used by ProPublica, with a significant increase in the F1
measure. To test for statistical significance, we use the paired bootstrap test as
recommended by Reichart et al. [13]. With the bootstrap test, we draw 1000
different samples. The size of each sample is the same as the full data, and the
train and test sets are obtained using the above-mentioned split by advertisers.
For each sample we evaluate the F1 score of the baseline and our method. The
scores are then used to check the statistical significance via the bootstrap test
implemented by Dror et al.6 with a 0.05 significance level.
Further to our research question, the evaluation also shows that using the
targeting attributes for classification of political ads can further improve the
performance, compared the text-only methods. Even though the improvement
is not large, it gives motivation to further investigate differences in the patterns
of targeting users between political and non-political ads.
To study the feature importance to our LightGBM model, we use Tree SHAP
[1], a fast algorithm to compute SHAP values [2] for trees, as implemented by
Lundberg et al.7. Figure 7 shows the most important keywords, sorted by the sum
of SHAP value magnitudes over all training samples. The list includes terms that
can be expected to be associated with political ads, such as ”trump”, ”senate”,
”congress” and more.
Figure 8 shows the most important targeting attributes. It uses SHAP values
to show the distribution of the impacts each feature has on the model output.
6 https://github.com/rtmdrr/
7 https://github.com/slundberg/shap
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Fig. 7. Top 10 Most Important Keywords. The list contains terms that can be expected
to be associated with political ads.
Fig. 8. Top 15 Most Important Targeting Attributes. SHAP values show the distribu-
tion of the impacts each feature has on the model output. The ’ 0’ notation is used
for features representing an attribute with a missing value. We observe that certain
Regions and Interests are more likely to be targeted with political ads.
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The color represents the feature value: high (red) or low (blue), which is simply
1 or 0 for the binary attributes.
The most important attribute is the ’MinAge’. We can see that above a cer-
tain threshold, higher age values increase the chance of seeing a political ad.
Further examination (not presented herein) reveals that this threshold corre-
sponds to ’18’, which is also the legal voting age in the US. We can also see that
users with interest related to ’Barack Obama’, ’Bernie Sanders’ or the ’Demo-
cratic Party’ are more likely to see political ads. Lastly, this analysis reveals that
non-political advertisers are less likely to use the ’Region’ attribute for target-
ing. This could be expected since politicians are more likely to target the state
that elects them. On the other hand, users located in ’Texas’, ’California’, ’Min-
nesota’, ’Florida’ and ’New York’ are more likely to be targeted with political
ads. A comparison with the list provided by Ballotpedia.org 8 reveals that all
the states except ’New York’ are considered as battleground states.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This work is the first to study the ProPublica political ads dataset. The unique-
ness of the data lies in the targeting attributes that that were used by advertisers
to target users on social media. We first described the main characteristics of
the data and explored the targeting attributes with a series of interactive illus-
trations. Then, as a first step towards understating of political manipulation via
user targeting, we addressed the challenge of automatically identifying political
ads. Our method outperformed the current text-based classifier used by ProP-
ublica with a significant improvement in the F1 measure. We also demonstrated
the potential for further improvement in identifying political ads by using the
targeting attributes. Lastly, we studied the feature importance of our method
and pointed out interesting insights with regard to language differences between
political and non-political ads, and the use of targeting attributes in political
advertising, such as that users in battleground states are more likely to be tar-
geted.
We consider several avenues for future work. First, the dataset contains ad-
ditional information that has not been utilized in this work. For example, the
ad images could potentially be helpful for the classification of political ads. A
key consideration for us has been to provide a simple and scalable solution.
This leaves room for future work to experiment with more sophisticated meth-
ods, such as learning user-based embeddings based on the targeting attributes
to potentially show even greater improvement in performance compared to the
text-only methods. Moreover, the identification of political ads allows for future
work to explore the rich data provided by the targeting attributes in more detail.
For example, to investigate which political ads were associated with which users
and which targeting attributes, and specifically with regard to regional targeting
which we found to be important. Overall, we hope these preliminary results will
8 https://ballotpedia.org
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help to spark future work on understanding of political manipulation via user
targeting and ways of addressing it.
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